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[Plablo's hand gripped his hard and pressed it frankly and he returned the
grip.... We must be allies now, he thought. There was always much
handshaking with allies. Not to mention decorations and kissing on both
cheeks, he thought. I'm glad we do not have to do that. I suppose all allies
are like this. They always hate each other au fond.1
In Ernest Hemingway's tale of the Spanish Civil War, For Whom the
Bell Tolls, Robert Jordan, an American, leads a band of guerrillas to
blow up a bridge, so that the Republicans can more effectively prosecute
the war against the Fascists. What transforms the book from a techni-
cally superior account of a military operation into a modem classic is
Hemingway's insight into human nature,2 especially into the variety of
emotional responses to the crisis of carrying out the operation, and his
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I. E. HEMINGWAY, FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS 404 (1940) (Robert Jordan speaking).
2. Hemingway's genius was manifested in his ability to examine human situations on a
variety of analytic levels. The study of international relations also occurs on a variety of levels.
Scholars derive insight into international relations by analogizing the behavior of states to that
of individuals, firms, or even markets. For example, a classic analysis of international rela-
tions, elaborating the insights that can be drawn from the study of human nature, is found in
K. WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE AND WAR 16-79 (1959). For a treatment of the different levels
on which international relations analysis may be carried out, see generally Singer, The Level-
of-Analysis Problem in International Relations, in THE INTERNATIONAL SYsTEM 77 (K.
Knorr & S. Verba eds. 1961). One might even try to use Hemingway's insights into how
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ability to relate the cast of characters to the larger social context in which
they are fighting. For example, Jordan can never articulate to his band
just why they are fighting at all, let alone why it is so important that they
blow up that particular bridge.3 His inability to educate his allies leads
to a variety of problems, including, perhaps, the cowardice of Pablo, the
Spanish guerilla leader.
4
In Ally versus Ally, Antony Blinken has written a technically superior
account of the Soviet Pipeline crisis. 5 Blinken sets out the variety of is-
sues and perspectives usually involved in the analysis of international cri-
ses with clarity. He even points to some aspects of the larger social
context that give the crisis enduring significance. 6 Yet, all too often, the
reader is left wishing that Blinken had spent more time linking the facts
to the broader theoretical issues raised by the controversy. To review a
book and to criticize its author for not producing a Hemingway on his
first try7 is, of course, a bit unfair. But the study of international rela-
tions and international law does require efforts at theory-building. This
review essay will attempt to draw upon Blinken's analysis and to use it as
a starting point toward building a theory of international relations.
Part I of this review discusses the imposition of the American embargo
and presents a variety of issues that Blinken appropriately raises. Part II
examines some of the concerns of international relations theory and tries
to link efforts at theory-building to the problems that Blinken poses. In
doing so, I hope to encourage alternative policy choices by expanding the
realist paradigm. Finally, Part III attempts to develop an "expectations"
humans behave when forced into a loose alliance to illuminate the dynamics of the Western
alliance during the Pipeline crisis.
3. During one poignant moment of introspection, Jordan argues to himself:
You went into it knowing what you were fighting for. You were fighting against exactly
what you were doing and being forced into doing to have any chance of winning. So now
he was compelled to use these people whom he liked as you should use troops toward
whom you have no feeling at all if you were to be successful.
E. HEMINGWAY, supra note 1, at 162. In the Pipeline crisis, the United States faced a central
problem for decision-making in alliances: whether to impose a decision by command or to
consult one's allies so as to arrive at a consensus. Like Jordan, President Reagan could never
articulate clearly why it was so important that the alliance "blow up" the Pipeline project.
4. President Reagan's inability to convince the allies of the value of the Pipeline sanctions
led to a variety of problems, including, perhaps, Western fear of continued confrontation with
the Soviet Union.
5. A. BLINKEN, ALLY VERSUS ALLY: AMERICA, EUROPE, AND THE SIBERIAN PIPELINE
CRISIS (1987) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
6. Blinken highlights three broad issues that the Pipeline controversy raises: 1) Was the
pipeline "a wise or a foolish strategic and economic undertaking for the West"? 2) What were
the "long-term consequences of the crisis within the alliance"? 3) What insights could be
gained "into the future possibilities and limitations of Western trade policy toward the Soviet
Union"? P. 13.





framework with respect to one policy approach that Blinken analyzes:
containment. This framework seeks to promote values such as stability
and mutual adjustment and, in a larger sense, to blend considerations of
power and principle. By linking practice to theory, this review attempts
to give more shape to the rich data that Blinken offers.
I. Pipeline Issues and the Fragments of Theory
In Blinken's book, the Americans lead a group of allies in attempting
to "blow up" a pipeline "bridge" so that the Republicans can more effec-
tively prosecute a trade war against the totalitarians. Blinken conceptu-
alizes the pipeline as a "physical, living link between East and West at a
time when relations between the two blocs were fast reverting to Cold
War status... ."I He reports that European leaders themselves believed
that by building the pipeline Western Europe "could serve as a bridge
between Washington and Moscow, thus assuring its own security and
reasserting leadership in the concert of nations." 9 Thus, on a variety of
levels, the Soviet Pipeline controversy can be studied as more than a
political dispute. Like Hemingway's bridge, it can serve as a window
into an examination of the larger social context of international behavior.
Blinken analyzes the Pipeline crisis from several different angles.
First, he traces the history of the deal as a response to the West's need for
energy. Next, he examines the Pipeline deal both from the micro-level of
how the supply contracts were written and from the macro-level of the
political issues at stake. Third, he focuses on the American embargo and
describes how each ally reacted to its imposition and subsequent with-
drawal. Finally, he ties together the various Western European re-
sponses by discussing the problems of alliance politics within the context
of different policy approaches. A short review of the facts should set the
stage for an examination of the more theoretical points Blinken raises.
A. The Embargo'°
Between 1980 and 1984, the Soviet Union constructed a 3,000-mile
pipeline to supply natural gas to Western Europe. To accomplish this
massive undertaking, the Soviet Union sought financing, equipment, and
technology from the West. On December 29, 1981, while the pipeline
was still under construction, President Reagan barred U.S. companies
8. P. 34.
9. P. 78.
10. For a discussion of the imposition of the American embargo, see DeSouza, The Soviet
Gas Pipeline Incident: Extension of Collective Responsibilities to Peacetime Commercial Trade,
10 YALE J. INT'L L. 92 (1984).
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from supplying pipeline equipment for the project. The President's deci-
sion was motivated by a variety of policy considerations, the most salient
being the need to respond to the imposition of martial law in Poland. On
June 18, 1982, the President broadened the ban to include all pipeline
equipment manufactured by Western firms under license from US. com-
panies. These restrictions were criticized by both domestic and interna-
tional leaders on political, economic, and legal grounds. The dispute
ended when an informal understanding was reached between the United
States and the relevant members of the Atlantic Alliance. On November
13, 1982, President Reagan lifted the sanctions.
This informal agreement had little real effect on the trade policies of
the allies. The alliance agreed to: a) refrain from entering into new con-
tracts for the purchase of Soviet natural gas until an alliance study of
alternative Western sources of energy could be carried out; b) strengthen
controls on the transfer of strategic items to the Soviet Union; and c)
establish procedures for monitoring financial relations with the Soviet
Union which would be consistent with alliance export credit policies.
The ban on new natural gas contracts, however, did not affect the long-
term arrangements previously concluded by the Western Europeans and
the Soviet Union.
This outcome indicated that expectations in the Atlantic Alliance had
crystallized around the norm that states are "free to engage in peacetime
commercial transactions, even at the risk of transferring power through
the wealth process to an adversarial alliance."' 1 Moreover, the crisis re-
vealed that the collective security arrangement had found its limit, in
that member states considered the alliance to be a means to safeguard a
public order goal of national autonomy and not an end in itself.'2 As
Blinken puts it, "western Europe will not forego the benefits of trade
with the East in conditions short of war or acute tension ... [T]he
NATO alliance they joined was meant to be a shield not a sword.
NATO's charter describes a defensive alliance." 13
B. Issues: The Demands of Policy
Eugene Rostow once pointed out that "[a]n academic book about for-
eign policy normally... begin[s] with a geopolitical analysis of our na-
tional interest in the changing realm of world politics."1 4 Since Blinken
11. Id. at 117.
12. Id.
13. Pp. 154-55.





is writing about the response of the Western alliance to the Soviet Pipe-
line crisis, one would expect a chapter exploring theoretical questions
about the geopolitical interests of the alliance vis-A-vis the Soviet Union.
For example: What is the West's vision of world public order? Is the
West interested in stability, evolutionary change, or dynamic change?
What are the minimum requirements for policy that would achieve such
a preferred order? How does the relative distribution of power between
alliances affect the prospects for attaining the West's vision of interna-
tional relations? What are the limits of collective security? What room
is there for independent action by sovereign states? The latter question is
particularly critical if one considers the aphorism that "peace really is
indivisible."' 15
Blinken does not develop this theoretical analysis. He spends a great
deal of time setting out the internal divisions within the Western alliance
and not enough on how these divisions relate to the common goal of a
preferred public order that the alliance was designed to achieve. That
Blinken does not undertake this theoretical analysis is a surprise, since he
poses various questions throughout the book that lead the reader to be-
lieve he will do so. At one point, for example, Blinken notes:
A case study of the pipeline cannot help straying into the broader issues of
East-West coexistence.... The alliance has vacillated among trying to
destroy the Soviet system by force, merely containing its expansion, and
encouraging it toward peaceful evolution; the pipeline crisis is a useful
litmus test for these approaches. Moreover, it highlights the practical limi-
tations on each approach within the framework of a voluntary alliance
composed of politically independent and economically competitive
powers. 16
An argument such as this demands a chapter developing a theoretical
framework. Although Blinken has chapters on strategic issues17 and the
debate over policy,' such chapters remain at the level of tactics rather
than attempting to explore the requirements of a preferred public order.
Before examining the needs of theory-building in international relations,
it is useful to look at some points that Blinken does make that could
provide a bridge to a more theoretical treatment.
In chapter four, Blinken identifies what he entitles "strategic issues."
He begins with the apt question of what it means to have leverage over a
15. Rostow, Containment, Peace, and the Charter, in 2 CONTAINMENT: CONCEPT AND
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primary adversary. 19 From such an opening, one might expect a brief
discussion of the effect of leverage on the changing balance of power
among states. Instead, in presenting the variety of perspectives involved
in the crisis, Blinken focuses only on the probabilities for the exercise of
power in a particular instance.20 Whether the issue is the reliability of
the Soviets as energy suppliers, 21 the possibility of doomsday scenarios, 22
the relative mix of Soviet hard currency earnings between oil and gas,
23
or the use of forced labor,24 he focuses on how the particular use of
power might be applied rather than on the relationship of the issue to the
larger dynamic of international relations. For instance, the forced labor
question could have been framed in terms of the normative restraints on
the realpolitik way of doing business in international relations. 25
In chapter nine, Blinken elaborates on what he calls "The Great De-
bate." He sets out three "strategic approaches"-trade denial, linkage,
and pro-trade-which have been used by the West to regulate its trade
relations with the East.26 Although Blinken gives some hints of a theo-
retical orientation in this chapter also, his analysis once again remains
concerned with the tactical uses of power. In his treatment of the strat-
egy of trade denial, Blinken provides an excellent discussion of the link
between the gains from trade and the resources the Soviets have for mili-
tary applications, 27 as well as the problems of regulating "dual use" tech-
nologies.28 Concerning linkage, he describes the domestic political
difficulties that undermined Henry Kissinger's program to establish a
"network of relationships. '29 But while Blinken presents much useful
information in examining the "trade denial" and "linkage" approaches,
his failure to analyze this information in a broader conceptual framework
robs his analysis of much of its power.
19. P. 49.
20. See pp. 49-66. International relations theorists have attempted to build theory from
statistical analyses of probabilities and expectations of utility. See generally B. BUENO DE





25. Blinken hints at framing the discussion in such a theoretical way as he points out,
"Man's inhumanity to man is common knowledge.... This view, while admittedly grounded
in a realistic perception of the way nations tend to act and interact, is not particularly satisfy-
ing." P. 65. More could have been said with respect to the role of normative imperatives in
international politics. For such a treatment, which analyzes the normative restraints on power
with respect to the supply of food, see Puchala & Hopkins, International Regimes: Lessons








Of the three discussions of strategy, Blinken's pro-trade analysis comes
closest to providing a theoretical framework that could illuminate the
geopolitics of a public order of East-West trade relations. As Blinken
points out, "Beneath the trade for trade's sake view, often, lies a strategic
vision. Some pro-traders believe commerce can, in -the long run, help
stimulate a peaceful and positive evolution of Soviet foreign and domestic
policies." °30 Blinken adds that "[h]uman and intellectual interaction of
this sort [by business executives, academics, scientists, and artists] may
help change perspectives favorably. '31 At this point, a behavioral theory
of rational expectations derived from empirical evidence of on-going
business relationships could be introduced to examine how particularized
uses of power are shaped by the predominant ways of doing business.32
Economic research on rational expectations provides important theoreti-
cal insights for the study of decision-making in international relations. It
tries to study the relationship between the subjective expectations of deci-
sion-makers and the objective reality of a situation.33 Analyzed against
the background of such an expectations framework, the three "strategic
approaches" and the variety of evidence that Blinken presents can have
more meaning for the study of international relations.
II. The Need for Theory-Building in International Relations
Bridges can be constructed everywhere. Robert Cover conceptualized
law "as a system of tension or a bridge linking a concept of reality to an
imagined alternative. ' 34 It is this understanding of law that can help
open up the realist paradigm, which focuses almost exclusively on the use
of power in international relations, and enable us to construct a theory
that not only better approximates the world in which we live, but also
allows us to shape policies that can lead us to a preferred future. The
examination of possible alternative futures is the type of analysis that
30. P. 146.
31. Id.
32. For an illustration of this approach, see infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
33. For a general treatment of rational expectations, see S. SHEFFRIN, RATIONAL EXPEC-
TATIONS 1-23 (1983). For example, economists have offered a "cobweb theorem" to capture
the observation that "farmers' planting decisions depend[ not only on current market price,
but also] on the prices they expect[ ] to receive when the crop [is] marketed." Id. at 3. Differ-
ent assumptions concerning price expectations could "radically alter the actual price dynamics
in the market." Id.
34. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV.
L. REv. 4, 9 (1983). For a further analysis of the late Professor Cover's metaphor of law as a
bridge, see Garet, Meaning and Ending, 96 YALE L.J. 1801, 1804, 1808-15 (1987). Cover
argued that law, as a system of tension, created a normative universe between reality and a
vision of an alternative future. Cover, supra, at 9.
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Rostow calls for in any consideration of the national interest.35 By view-
ing the Pipeline crisis against the backdrop of an expectations framework
infused with a concept of international law, we might better understand
the enduring significance of the pipeline as a "physical, living link be-
tween East and West."
3 6
A. Reimagining the Nomos of International Relations
In surveying the needs of theory-building in international relations, it
is useful to start with some basic premises. First, we live in a world that
is ordered by 37 and filled with social institutions 38 that shape the policy
decisions, such as those surrounding the Pipeline controversy, that in
turn affect that order. Some of these decisions are "creative, speculative,
adaptive, and risk-taking... [while others] are cautious, predictable, and
risk averse."'39 The former have been metaphorically called engines and
accelerators, the latter, brakes and stabilizers. 4° These decisions affect
the international order in different ways: "accelerators" produce polit-
ical change and often lead to conflict, while "brakes" produce restraint
and often lead to stability. Both international relations theorists41 and
international legal theorists42 have tried to study and explain these deci-
sions and the expectations that result from them.
35. See supra text accompanying note 14.
36. P. 34. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
37. By ordered, I mean that there are patterns of human behavior that communicate ex-
pectations which, in turn, shape future decisions. These basic patterns promote certain goals
of human society. For a further elaboration of the meaning of order in international relations,
see H. BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 8, 20
(1977). Professor Bull contends that the primary goals of the international order are: 1) pres-
ervation of the system and of the society of states itself, 2) maintenance of the independence or
external sovereignty of individual states; 3) peace; and 4) achievement of the common objec-
tives of social life-limiting violence, keeping promises, and stabilizing possession by property
rules. Id. at 16-20.
38. Oran Young points out that we live in a world of social institutions called "regimes,"
see infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text, in which expectations converge around recog-
nized patterns of practice. Young, International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation, 32
WORLD POL. 331, 332 (1980). Regimes govern issues regarding money, international trade,
natural resources, and management of power. Id. at 331. In this respect, regimes are funda-
mental building blocks of the international order. For a more precise definition of the term as
used in international relations theory, see Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Conse-
quences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36 INT'L ORG. 185, 185 (1982).
39. Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 604 (1987).
40. See id.
41. For an excellent analysis that develops a theory of international relations as "interde-
pendent decision-making," in which the various participants act based on the expectations of
others' behavior, see T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 14-16 (1960).
42. Professors McDougal and Reisman have conceptualized the making of law as a func-
tion of decisions that "create, in a target audience, a complex set of expectations." McDougal
& Reisman, The Prescribing Function in the World Constitutive Process: How International
Law Is Made, in M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS 355 (1981).
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In my own research regarding the Pipeline controversy 43 (and I believe
that Blinken comes to the same conclusion) 44 a consistent pattern of deci-
sions emerged with respect to American sanctions on East-West trade.
Over time, the Western alliance has rejected, as a part of the security
arrangement, U.S. attempts to restrict peacetime, commercial transac-
tions with the Soviet Union and its allies.45 Based on this pattern of
decisions, one might propose the hypothesis for international relations
theory that a norm now exists under which alliance members consider
themselves free to engage in peacetime commercial transactions even at
the risk of transferring to the Soviets additional wealth derived from the
gains from trade.
46
This norm, by validating current expectations, 47 shapes future expecta-
tions and decisions.48 In doing so, it leads us toward a particular future
which reflects the preferences of the Atlantic Alliance. Blinken, I be-
lieve, considers this set of decisions to be "brakes." For example,
Blinken argues that the trade "pillar" stabilized political relations be-
tween Moscow and Washington during the 1970s.49 This norm with re-
spect to East-West trade has thus shaped behavior between states. It
remains to be discussed, however, where this aspect of international life
fits into the study of international relations.
43. See DeSouza, supra note 10, at 117.
44. See pp. 115-17.
45. See DeSouza, supra note 10, at 96-99.
46. Id. at 117.
47. For a sample of contemporary expectations in international community with respect to
the Pipeline controversy, see id. at 112.
48. Some international relations theorists have speculated that historical developments
constrain future decisions because they lead participants down particular paths at different
points in time. For an elaboration of "path dependency" with respect to international rela-
tions, see S. Krasner, Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective (February 1987) (Unpublished
manuscript, copies on file with the Department of Political Science, Stanford University and
Yale Journal of International Law).
49. P. 88. On a different level of analysis, Blinken points out that the economic benefits of
trade with the East served to stabilize domestic politics within Western countries by quelling
unrest brought about by rising unemployment. P. 92. Such political and social unrest within
the alliance could disrupt its foreign policy initiatives, especially in times of crisis. For a treat-
ment of how domestic economic circumstances affect foreign policy choices, see generally BE-
TWEEN POWER AND PLENTY: FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL
STATES (P. Katzenstein ed. 1978) [hereinafter BETWEEN POWER AND PLENTY].
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B. The State of International Relations Theory
Central to the study of international relations is an examination of the
patterns of behavior of states.50 Theory-building efforts seek to develop a
framework for asking questions about these patterns.5 1
International relations may be conceived of as a continuing historical
process in which the international system remains at a status quo posi-
tion "if the more powerful states in the system are satisfied with existing
territorial, political, and economic arrangements. ' 52 Moreover, as Ed-
ward Carr pointed out in a classic study of international relations, under-
standing the behavior of states around the status quo requires exploring
the "compromise between the utopian conception of a common feeling of
right and the realist conception of a mechanical adjustment to changed
equilibrium of forces."' 53 This "compromise" calls to mind similar
themes struck in Professor Cover's jurisprudence of expanding the pos-
sibilities for a preferred normative universe.
54
By studying the compromise between utopian and realist conceptions
of international relations, one can aspire to more than just understanding
the dynamism of international behavior. Analyzing the "system of ten-
sion" between conceptions serves to illuminate an element essential for
shaping peaceful international change: "win[ning] the confidence of the
dissatisfied."'55 Shaping peaceful change requires not only a give-and-
take between nations, in order to keep states satisfied, but also an element
of self-sacrifice by the most powerful states.56 In this way, stable patterns
of state behavior-one goal of the international order-are maintained.
Studying the compromise between utopian and realist conceptions of
international relations does not mean that these conceptions are distinct
elements. Professor Carr conceived of international relations as involv-
ing the inter-relationship of utopian and realist conceptions, of morality
and power.5 7 Thus, in examining patterns of international behavior, one
50. Professor Gilpin notes that even though political change in international relations may
be the result of unpredictable events, "it is possible to identify recurrent patterns, common
elements, and general tendencies...." R. GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITIcs 3
(1981).
51. Id. at 2.
52. Id. at 11. Professor Gilpin sets out a series of assumptions about the behavior of states
in international relations. At the heart of these assumptions lies the notion of cost-benefit
analysis as motivating state behavior. States will attempt to change the international system as
long as the marginal benefits exceed the marginal costs. Id. at 10-11.
53. E. CARR, THE TwENTY YEARS' CRISIS 1919-1939, at 222-23 (1962).
54. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
55. E. CARR, supra note 53, at 214; see also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
56. E. CARR, supra note 53, at 168.
57. Id. at 222, 223. Even where the give-and-take of international behavior is accom-




must account for aspects of both normative behavior and the naked use
of power. The current state of theory-building in international relations,
though, mistakenly tries to separate normative behavior from uses of
power in its attempt to isolate explanatory variables for international
outcomes.
1. The Inadequacies of International Relations Theory
Philosophers of science often describe scientific method-including
that of the social sciences-as the testing of hypotheses through at-
tempted falsification. 58 Such falsification generates new hypotheses that
advance the theoretical framework. Because the dominant paradigm of
international relations theory-realism-does not adequately address the
interrelationship between norms and power, it cannot generate auxiliary
hypotheses to test that paradigm.59
Political realism leaves out of its assumptions the role of norms. Real-
ists believe that anarchy is the rule in human nature; order, justice, and
morality are exceptions.60 They may choose to admit the possibility of
behavioral norms, but essentially they maintain that "the final arbiter of
things political is power."' 61 Realists also insist that the essence of social
reality is the group (the state for international relations purposes), the
unit through which humans confront each other.62 Finally, realist think-
ing involves the "primacy in all political life of power and security in
human motivation. ' 63
These assumptions cannot always explain political reality. For exam-
ple, with respect to the Pipeline controversy, one might ask, if power is
the "final arbiter," how was it that the most powerful member of the
Western alliance could not lead its allies to achieve a collective security
goal? Was it because of a failure in the tactical uses of power, or was the
outcome determined by the norm of behavior that had emerged with re-
spect to the economic autonomy of states? If one remains at Blinken's
the game. Id. at 215. In fact, "power plays a part in determining our moral outlook." Id. at
219.
58. See generally Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research
Programmes, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 91, 132-38 (I. Lakatos & A.
Musgrave eds. 1970).
59. Professor Keohane, in surveying the dominant research program in international rela-
tions, political realism, points to the need for developing auxiliary hypotheses regarding the
rules and patterns of decision-making that affect calculations of interest in world politics. Ke-
ohane, Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond, in POLITICAL SCIENCE:
THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 503, 532 (A. Finifter ed. 1983).
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level of analysis, without attempting to generate hypotheses for theory-
building, one might be left with the impression that the outcome of the
Pipeline crisis was determined only by American tactical mistakes in the
application of political power.
Realism can blind policy analysts to the true lessons of the Pipeline
controversy." "Blindness" is currently evident as U.S. policy-makers
continue mistakenly to waste political capital by attempting to force al-
lies to adhere to U.S. economic sanctions against adversaries, such as
Nicaragua65 and Libya,66 when the norm of economic autonomy of states
during peacetime dictates that their efforts will fail.
The empirical evidence offered by the Pipeline controversy calls into
question the assumptions of the realist position on the use of power as an
explanatory variable for this particular outcome. Behavior by the West-
ern alliance reflected the adoption of a norm that guided decision-making
during the Pipeline crisis.67 Moreover, as Blinken suggests, the outcome
of the crisis reinforced goals, such as stability and the independence of
states, and values, such as keeping promises, that are fundamental to in-
ternational order.6 8 This expansion in the range of "protected" values
beyond power and security shows that the international system is not
merely a reflection of the existing distribution of power, as in the realist
paradigm.
Recently, international relations theorists suggested the concept of
"regime" in order to expand the theoretical structure of realism to in-
clude behavior determined by norms.69 This concept, although still
"conceptually thin" and in need of development, 70 may be helpful in ana-
lyzing the Pipeline controversy.
Regimes are defined as "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-
area."' 71 A regime is a variable used "to account for the persistence of
[certain types of international] behavior and outcomes even though basic
64. See DeSouza, supra note 10, at 117.
65. Exec. Order No. 12,513, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,629 (1985), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701
note at 661 (Supp. III 1985); see also DeSouza, supra note 10, at 117 & n.148.
66. Exec. Order No. 12,543, 51 Fed. Reg. 875 (1986), reprinted in 51 U.S.C. § 1701 note at
663 (Supp. III 1985).
67. See supra text accompanying note 11.
68. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
69. International relations theorists began a serious effort to articulate the concept of re-
gimes at a conference in Palm Springs, California, in February 1981. Key articles from the
conference were collected and presented in volume 36, issue 2 of International Organization
(Spring 1982). Krasner, [Untitled Introduction to Issue], 36 INT'L ORG. 184 (1982).
70. Young, International Regimes Toward a New Theory of Institution (Book Review), 39
WORLD POL. 104, 106 (1986) (presenting arguments of critics of regime concept).




causal factors associated with political power have changed."' 72 A regime
may act as an intervening variable, conditioning outcomes produced
more directly by such factors as the relative distribution of political and
military power, or it may even assume a life of its own and thus act as a
causal variable.73 Its development as a conceptual variable distinct from
power has enabled new hypotheses to be generated within the realist
paradigm.
The most pointed criticism of this concept is that it "diverts attention
away from the analysis of power relationships that ... should constitute
the major concern of students of international relations." 74 This criti-
cism reflects the realist research agenda in international relations. Real-
ist theorists argue for the predominance of politics in understanding the
world.75 They believe that factors such as the national interest and the
relative distribution of power capabilities among various states76 deter-
mine international outcomes by themselves.
77
Such criticism of regime analysis overlooks the reality that the use of
power is purposive. Choices with respect to when, where, and how
power is used are guided by expectations of what other actors are going
to do. As a result, purposive conduct is channelled into "rules of prudent
behavior" that enable states both to protect their interests and to mini-
mize international conflict.
78
72. Krasner, Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables, 36
INT'L ORG. 497, 500 (1982).
73. Id. at 499.
74. Young, supra note 70, at 118.
75. Professor Kenneth Waltz argues that "[t]o be a success, such a theory [of international
relations] has to show how international politics can be conceived of as a domain distinct from
the economic, social, [international legal,] and other international domains that one may con-
ceive of." K. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 79 (1979).
76. Waltz requires that power be analyzed as a unified index of economic, military, and
political capabilities. Id. at 130. Although outside the scope of this essay, methodological
questions may be raised as to how such an index is compatible with a theory that argues for the
autonomous sphere of politics.
77. Professor Susan Strange pushes the critique of the regime concept further. She argues,
first, that the concept is used to rationalize a downturn in U.S. power during the 1970s; second,
that it is imprecise; third, that it is value-biased in that the concept is assumed to be a posi-
tively-valued good; fourth, that regime analysis represents too static a view of international
relations; and fifth, that the concept overestimates the gains and underestimates the costs of
international cooperation. Strange, Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis, 36
INT'L ORG. 479, 479-93 (1982).
78. Professors Gordon Craig and Alexander George point to a "nonperfectionist" school
of thought in considering perspectives on the use of force in international relations.
Nonperfectionists formulate questions regarding the use of force as follows: "Under what con-
ditions do which ends justify what means?" G. CRAIG & A. GEORGE, FORCE AND STATE-
CRAFT: DIPLOMATIC PROBLEMS OF OUR TIME 274 (1983) (emphasis in original).
Nonperfectionists are described as taking a "contextualist approach... employ[ing] situational
ethics, not absolutist ethical standards." Id. (emphasis in original). Such an approach to the
use of power suggests a normative component embedded in the "power variable" stipulated by
realist theory.
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For this reason, it is a mistake to think about international decision-
making as determined solely by the existing distribution of power
between states. As currently set forth, however, the "regime" concept
involves a checklist of elements without any tie-in to a "larger system of
ideas that would help solve definitional ambiguities ... and that would
offer guidance in formulating key questions and hypotheses regarding in-
ternational regimes."' 79 By isolating power and regimes as separate, in-
dependent variables that explain outcomes, theorists, while being
methodologically more precise, fail to articulate the inter-relationship be-
tween norms and power in purposive state behavior. In part III, I at-
tempt to develop a public international jurisprudence based on patterns
of practice and rational expectations that gives international relations
concepts, such as "regime," a tie-in to a larger system of ideas that takes
into account both power and principle.
80
2. Pipeline Expectations
Antony Blinken offers raw material for further developing existing the-
ories of international behavior that are grounded in the expectations of
conduct among the various states. Such a theoretical level of analysis
would better generate new hypotheses about broader issues such as the
West's vision of world public order and the minimum requirements for
attaining such a preferred order.
Building on Robert Axelrod's initial work using computer simulation
to propose and study the evolution of behavioral norms,8' international
79. See Young, supra note 70, at 106.
80. The dominant exposition of the realist research program in international relations the-
ory, as presented in K. WALTZ, supra note 75, does not even raise the possibility of interna-
tional law guiding state behavior. Law is mentioned only in the "scientific" sense as
replicating relations between variables. Id. at 1. To Professor Waltz, "[l]aws are facts of ob-
servation." Id. at 6. It is ironic that Waltz is actually employing a notion of law that is also
used in the jurisprudential sense. Compare the great legal realist Karl Llewellyn's search for
"[legal tiheory that can face fact." Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 40 (1934). See also infra text accompanying notes 144-45 (incident methodology pro-
viding legal theory that can face fact).
81. Axelrod has identified additional hypotheses for testing the realist paradigm. He
points to the need to explore the requirements of a normative order and the interactive rela-
tionship between that order and the behavior of groups (in this case states). Axelrod, An
Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 1095 (1986); see also R. AXELROD,
THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (fuller treatment of how norms of cooperation arise
and develop). He calls for the development of a theory of "how norms arise, how norms are
maintained, and how one norm displaces another." Axelrod, supra, at 1096. His research
focuses on coordinated behavior that takes place under conditions of anarchy, as exist in inter-
national relations. He-defines a norm in terms of the extent to which "individuals usually act
in a certain way and are often punished when seen not to be acting in this way." Id. at 1097.
He evaluates norms on a growth-decay continuum rather than on just their existence. Id. In
studying this continuum, Axelrod focuses on the decision-making process of interactive behav-
ior. His "norms game" is based on an evolutionary theory of behavior that captures the dyna-
mism of international relations as a continuing historical process. Id.; see also supra note 52
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relations scholars have tried to outline the conditions under which norms
of cooperation exist in world politics. 8 2 When viewed from a game-the-
ory perspective,8 3 cooperation "occurs when actors adjust their behavior
to the actual or anticipated preferences of others."8s4 Such analyses focus
on interactive decision-making85 and the expectations that are generated
therefrom. Research indicates that "reciprocity" or "conditional cooper-
ation" is a required tactic for any strategy that seeks to promote behavior
that is guided by a norm of cooperation. 6 Further, the effectiveness of
reciprocity and ultimately the stability of the norm of cooperation de-
pend, inter alia, on whether the particular problem is an iterated game,
8 7
that is, whether it casts a "shadow of the future. ' 8 The shadow depends
on factors such as the length of the players' "time horizon," the "regular-
ity of stakes," the "reliability of information about the others' actions,"
and "quick feedback about changes in the others' actions. '8 9 Blinken
offers considerable evidence of such factors, showing that the Pipeline
decisions were shaped by expectations of mutual adjustment, the aware-
ness of norms of conduct, and the importance of reputation in an on-
going relationship. 90 At best, this evidences a continuing historical pro-
cess that points to a vision of world public order, with respect to East-
West trade, based on a norm of cooperation. At the very least, such
evidence generates new hypotheses for the realist paradigm.
and accompanying text. The evolution of norms is modeled as an N-person strategic situation,
where the choices involved reflect decisions to be bold or vengeful, which may also be thought
of as decisions that are either "accelerators" or "brakes." For a more elaborate presentation of
the simulated game, see Axelrod, supra, at 1099-1102. For further elaboration of the use of
game theory to illuminate interactive decision-making and the generation of expectations, see
infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text. The simulation, using strategies of reciprocity such
as tit-for-tat, pointed to the existence of metanorms that allowed for other norms to get started
and to be protected once they were established. Axelrod, supra, at 1102. Axelrod points to a
variety of mechanisms that also support the existence of norms, supplementing the effect of the
metanorms. Examples of these mechanisms include: a) a dominant player, such as a "hege-
mon" in international relations, who prevents others from receiving the collective benefits of
the metanorm without sharing in the costs of policing it; b) the effect of internationalization of
norms which makes it psychologically painful to violate them; and c) reputation which estab-
lishes expectations among the players. For an elaboration of Axelrod's findings on these sup-
port mechanisms, see id. at 1103-04, 1107-08. Such simulated results encourage further
inquiry into the role of norms in shaping policy decisions in international relations.
82. See, e.g., Axelrod & Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and
Institutions, 38 WORLD POL. 226 (1985).
83. Id. at 228; see also Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strat-
egies, 38 WORLD POL. 1 (1985).
84. Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 82, at 226.
85. See supra notes 41-42 & 70.
86. Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 82, at 249.
87. Game-theory analysis suggests that "an iterated environment permits resort to strate-
gies of reciprocity that may improve prospects of cooperation." Oye, supra note 83, at 14.
88. Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 82, at 232-34; see also Oye, supra note 83, at 14-17.
89. Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 82, at 232.
90. See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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Blinken offers evidence of mutual adjustment in his survey of the his-
tory of the pipeline project. He quotes a 1972 remark of U.S. Secretary
of Commerce Peter Peterson: "I believe that these types of joint projects
are potentially the single most important product of this new commercial
relationship in which the two largest economies of the world each adjust
their ways of doing business to the mutual benefit of both." 91 Blinken's
research also suggests that, in addition to a willingness by both sides to
adjust, all parties-the Soviets, the Americans, and the Western Europe-
ans-were concerned about their respective reputations as reliable busi-
ness partners. 92 These two factors suggest a willingness on both sides to
maintain the status quo. In Professor Carr's terms, the stability of East-
West behavior in peacetime commercial trade indicates an accepted com-
promise between a utopian conception of cooperation and a realist con-
ception of a "mechanical adjustment to changed equilibrium of forces."' 93
Under these conditions of stability, the historical pattern of decisions by
the Western allies regarding the pipeline may be considered "brakes" on
the processes of international change. This is why the American attempt
to change settled expectations of cooperation in East-West trade met
with severe opposition. As Blinken points out, "[o]fficials in Washington
admit that they failed to anticipate the violent European reaction."
94
By focusing solely on the tactical uses of power in the Pipeline contro-
versy, Blinken misses the implication of the event for world public order.
On a variety of levels, the expectations of state autonomy with respect to
peacetime commercial trade shape the Atlantic Alliance's vision of its
preferred future.95 At the most theoretical level, these expectations offer
support for the contention that norms sometimes guide political deci-
sions. This result generates new hypotheses for the realist framework in
international relations. In addition, evidence of the existence of "rules of
conduct" in the use of power ties such decisions into a larger system of
ideas offered by public international law. On another level, the particular
set of expectations regarding peacetime commercial trade offers insights
into the decision-making processes that constitute "brakes" and "stabi-
lizers" in international relations. One such insight is that continued sta-
91. P. 29. Soviet flexibility in renegotiating downward the price of gas to the Western
Europeans indicates the current stability of expectations with respect to mutual adjustment,
See pp. 42-45.
92. P. 45 (Soviets' concern about their reputation); p. 126 (U.S. companies' concern); p.
124 (Western Europeans' concern). Reputation is an important factor for the enforcement of
norms. Because of iterated play and the threat of future reciprocity if one "defects" from the
relationship, each side has an incentive to maintain its reputation. See Axelrod & Keohane,
supra note 82, at 233 (significance of reputation with respect to international debt problems);
see also R. AXELROD, supra note 81, at 150-54 (strategies of interaction based on reputation).
93. E. CARR, supra note 53, at 222-23.
94. P. 104 (emphasis added).




bility requires some self-sacrifice in the political agenda of the most
powerful states.96 Finally, acknowledgement of current expectations,
and an understanding of the dynamic by which such expectations are
formed, is the first step toward shaping future choices with respect to
East-West trade. Effective public policy requires not only power but also
public education,97 so that expectations with respect to the minimum re-
quirements for a preferred public order may be articulated and tested.
Expectations, however, are not generated randomly. They are articu-
lated, shaped, and tested through the use of analytic frameworks that
make information processing by the public more manageable. 98 Blinken
acknowledges the "need for a shared allied approach to the issue of trade
with the Soviet bloc." 99 He also recognizes the fundamental question
that follows: "Which approach could find general acceptance within the
West and simultaneously meet the strategic and economic concerns of
the alliance countries?"I °° In part III, I outline one approach-contain-
ment-that seeks to promote expectations of stability and mutual adjust-
ment. In so doing, I try to develop a coherent theory for foreign policy
that blends considerations of power and principle.
III. Containment: A Framework For Shared Expectations
Blinken suggests three possible approaches for the West to the prob-
lem of managing East-West trade: confrontation, containment, or coop-
eration.10' Containment will be developed here as a legal concept, in that
96. See supra note 56 and accompanying text; see also p. 141 (reexamining the embargo
list).
97. Accountability in public administration requires public deliberation of issues. See
Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J.
1617, 1625 (1985). Public administrators, for example those in the Department of State,
should not merely make decisionsfor the public, but also help the public deliberate over issues
such as the preferred vision of world public order. See id. at 1637. Eugene Rostow points out
that "no nation, and surely no democratic nation, can carry out a sustained policy of any
importance, especially one that may involve the catastrophe of war, unless public opinion un-
derstands and accepts it." Rostow, supra note 14, at 1535. Thus, molding expectations among
the allies during the Pipeline controversy involved an aspect of testing expectations among
relevant domestic constituencies, for example the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. See DeSouza,
supra note 10, at 104.
98. Decision-makers often simplify the complexities of a situation by using frameworks
that enable them to take shortcuts in thinking about policy choices. For an analysis of such
"cognitive maps," see STRUCTURE OF DECISION: THE COGNITIVE MAPS OF POLITICAL
ELITES 3-55 (R. Axelrod ed. 1976). I suggest that the public uses similar methods to sift
through information and form an opinion about a given public policy situation.
99. P. 126. As noted earlier, see supra note 16 and accompanying text, Blinken points out
that the Pipeline controversy may be a litmus test for other Western approaches to Soviet
foreign policy. The range of approaches includes: a) "destroying the Soviet system by force";
b) "containing its expansion"; and c) "encouraging it towards peaceful evolution." See p. 13
(emphasis added).
100. P. 126 (emphasis added).
101. See p. 13.
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it enables us to set up for international relations Cover's normative
"bridge" between reality and a vision of a preferred future. 10 2 Such a
"bridge" will generate new hypotheses about world public order and
open up the realist paradigm for international relations theory.
To define the contours of this "bridge," I first introduce Professor
Carr's perspective on international law. This perspective helps explain
international behavior by enabling us to tie realist theory, with its notions
of regimes, into a larger system of ideas. Next, I develop the idea of
containment as a subordinate "legal" concept that can be integrated with
Carr's perspective on international law to implement my proposed
framework for foreign policy. Within this context, I discuss the debate
over containment and offer a reformulated version that may be used to
answer the policy's critics. Finally, I note some developments in interna-
tional jurisprudence that reinforce these ideas.
This framework takes raw data about a particular crisis-the one that
erupted around the Soviet gas pipeline-and places it within a broader
theoretical context. The focus of this framework is on shaping expecta-
tions of decision-making so as to establish behavioral norms with respect
to East-West trade that promote values such as stability. Containment
thus becomes a technique for promoting expectations. In this way,
Blinken's analysis becomes a central building block for a coherent foreign
policy that blends realism with a vision of world public order.
A. Carr's Perspective on International Law
Professor Carr's The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939 103 is a valuable
statement of international law derived from the international relations
theory of realism. This work analyzes the peace of the inter-war period
on the eve of World War II. As noted earlier, 104 Carr believed that polit-
ical life centered on the balance between realism and utopianism, be-
tween power and principle. He felt that, although realism exposed the
"hollowness" of utopianism, 10 5 it was of limited use in guiding decision-
making in international society because its very assumption of the "na-
ked struggle for power" made the idea of international society impossi-
ble.10 6 His vision of a synthesis of realism and utopianism infused
realism with the ingredients of elaboration of finite goals, allowance for
emotional appeals, right of moral judgments, and requirement of justifi-
102. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
103. E. CARR, supra note 53, at 170-80.
104. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.





cations. 10 7 These ingredients, by contributing to the development of
"rules of the game," would help structure expectations based on realism.
Without these ingredients, pure realism reduces international life to
chaos. 108
Professor Carr considered international law the "meeting place for
ethics and power," for the blending of utopianism and realism. 0 9 Law
to him was a function of neither fixed universal standards (the Kantian
perspective) nor the power of the state divorced from ethics (the Hobbes-
ian perspective). Rather, international law was based on the "political
community of nations." 1' 0 Law was binding because it represented the
rules and institutions that the international society had set up for itself to
live by-the Grotian perspective.'11 International law could only be un-
derstood within its social framework, where politics and law were inter-
twined. Thus law was not "self-contained," and neither was it "self-
creating []or self-applying. ' 112 Law was not merely text but rested on
the shared expectations that evolved from political practice.
International law, conceived of as expectations evolving from political
practice, can answer foreign policy demands for structural constraints on
Soviet expansionist ideology by promoting "rules of the game." As
noted above, expectations of future decision-making by states are shaped
by how power is channelled in the present and how power was used in
the past. The economic theory of rational expectations teaches that such
future expectations shape objective reality.1 13 Because it structures ex-
pectations, containment is a policy approach that activates this interna-
tional law framework based on political practice. In The Public and Its
Problems, the American pragmatist John Dewey offered an image of law
that can perhaps further illuminate this expectations framework. He
pointed out that "[r]ules of law are in fact the institution of conditions
under which persons [states] make their arrangements with one another.
They are structures which canalize action," much like the banks of a
river.114 By directing the uses of power along particular paths, contain-
ment molds expectations and functions as a legal concept.
107. See id.
108. See id; see also supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
109. E. CARR, supra note 53, at 178.
110. Id.
111. For a comparison of the Kantian, Hobbesian, and Grotian perspectives in interna-
tional relations theory, see H. BULL, supra note 37, at 41.
112. E. CARR, supra note 53, at 178.
113. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
114. J. DEwEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 54 (1946).
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B. Containment as a Legal Concept
International legal concepts such as containment can serve as building
blocks for foreign policy. They can be employed to meet the concerns of
Professor Carr that international law be based on political practice. Con-
sidering containment as a legal concept is a starting point, in that it is
compatible with Carr's concern that "[flaw give[ ] to society that element
of fixity and regularity and continuity without which no coherent life is
possible." 11 5 Infused with some of Carr's jurisprudential ingredients,
such as finite goals and the requirement of justification, containment can
be developed as a generative concept, a meeting place for principle and
power.
1. Kennan's Containment
Recently, Foreign Affairs published a retrospective examination of the
concept of containment. 116 George Kennan, in 1947, first conceived of
containment as a response to Soviet power, which he felt was a product
of "ideology and circumstance" and was manifested through a "basic
antagonism between capitalist and socialist worlds." He proposed that
the U.S. regard "the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner" and expect "a
cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all
rival influence and rival power." 117 I would assume that this applies to
economic tactics, such as the pipeline project, as well as military tactics.
Kennan argued that a coherent foreign policy strategy would be to apply
"counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political
points corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy
... ." 118 Such a sustained effort by the West would lead to a moderation
of Soviet expansionist ideology and a stabilization of the processes of in-
ternational change.
Kennan's position has evolved somewhat since 1947. He now looks at
containment in broader terms, calling for the development of a concept
"more closely linked to the totality of the problems of Western civiliza-
tion at this juncture in world history .... ,,19 The ideological-political
threat that he focused on forty years ago seems to have waned in his
estimation. Now it is the military of the Soviet Union and, more broadly,
the arms race with its "unanticipated consequences" that he is chiefly
115. E. CARR, supra note 53, at 179.
116. See W. Rostow, On Ending the Cold War, 65 FOREIGN AFF. 831 (1987); X [Kennan],
The Sources of Soviet Conduct, id. at 852 (reprint from 25 FOREIGN AFF. 566 (1947)); Lipp-
mann, The Cold War, id. at 869 (excerpts); Kennan, Containment Then and Now, Id. at 885.
117. X [Kennan], id. at 867.
118. Id. at 862.




worried about. Moreover, Kennan seeks an even wider application for
the containment concept: he feels that the United States must learn to
contain itself as well, given our "environmental destructiveness, our ten-
dency to live beyond our means .... -120
How does one make sense of this expansion of the concept of contain-
ment? Perhaps a useful focus, which encompasses both U.S. and Soviet
behavior, can be found in Professor Carr's insight that the blending of
realism and utopianism is manifested in public law, which is found, in
turn, in give-and-take, mutual adjustment, and self-limitation.121 Self-
limitation plays an especially important part in any on-going political
relationship, calling for each side to pass up short-term political gains in
order both to minimize the perceived threat to the other side and to max-
imize the stability of the system. In the Pipeline context, self-limitation
required the United States to accept the decision of the Atlantic Alliance
on peacetime commercial trade. It also required the Soviet Union to re-
negotiate the price of gas with the Western Europeans in order to rein-
force expectations that it is a reliable business supplier. The fact that
trade (as opposed to nuclear warfare) is necessarily an iterated game
gives both sides incentives to limit themselves in assessing possibilities for
political gain.
122
Making sense of Kennan's evolution in thought is only one task; the
dangers of his new outlook must also be assessed. Kennan's call for a
broader conceptualization of containment is intended to redirect atten-
tion away from our ideological rivalry with the Soviet Union. Such redi-
rection risks overlooking the most basic problem for the management of
a changing international environment: the balance of power. As W.W.
Rostow argued in Foreign Affairs, "the cold war... has arisen from the
fourth major effort in the twentieth century by a latecomer on the world
scene to enlarge its power at the expense of earlier frontrunners already
at or beyond the inherent limits of their international stature."
123
The rivalry between those interested in stability and those interested in
change remains as threatening to international life today, in the case of
the United States and the Soviet Union, as it did fifty years ago, in the
case of Britain and Germany, and more than 2500 years ago, in the case
of Athens and Sparta. Change grows out of the marginal cost/benefit
calculations of states interested in bringing it about. Containment at-
tempts to keep the system stable by altering these cost/benefit calcula-
tions. Such stability is critically important in the nuclear age, when
120. Id. at 889.
121. See supra notes 53 & 56 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
123. W. Rostow, supra note 116, at 831.
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crises can get out of control during transitions in the balance of power.
Blinken makes a similar point, noting that "projects such as the Siberian
pipeline pull the East-West relationship one step back from catastrophic
conflict .... "124
C. Containment Reformulated
A broad conceptualization of containment as a foreign policy strategy
highlights the need to slow the pace of international change, so that it
does not become destabilizing. Containment combines realism with vi-
sion through its concern for maintaining the balance of power. It incor-
porates Carr's essential ingredients for establishing "rules of the game"
in the political community: a) containment's goal is to maintain the bal-
ance of power; b) it takes emotional appeal into account in its challenge
to expansionist ideology; c) its morality is derived from the international
community's shared expectation of the integrity of the state system; and
d) its ground for action is that power is being used as a defensive measure
to counter persistent pressure aimed at disrupting the state system. By
structuring Soviet behavior through timely Western responses to Soviet
expansionist pressure, containment performs the legal function of estab-
lishing "rules of the game" based on practice. In this respect, contain-
ment can be viewed as a legal concept that derives its ultimate authority
as law from politics.125 More precisely, it may be thought of as a type of
customary law, using Lon Fuller's description of law as "a language of
interaction... a social situation in which the moves of the participating
players will fall generally within some predictable pattern.' 26
Present expectations of the moves other states will make are condi-
tioned by past events; in turn, future expectations are molded in the pres-
ent. 127 Firm American reaction to Soviet pressure can actually be
leadership, in that it shapes future expectations and thus modifies Soviet
decision-making. A basic premise of this framework is that Soviet deci-
sion-making is not mechanical, but internalizes the expectations of the
world around it to some degree.128 Blinken raises the possibility of an
124. P. 150; see also supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. As Robert McNamara
writes, "Things can go wrong [in crises]. Actions can lead to unintended consequences. Sig-
nals can be misread. Technologies can fail. Crises can escalate even if neither side wants war."
McNamara, Blundering Into Disaster: The First Century of the Nuclear Age, 5 BROOKINGS
Rnv. 3, 9 (1987).
125. E. CARR, supra note 53, at 180.
126. Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 171, 173 (R. Wolff
ed. 1971) (emphasis in original omitted).
127. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
128. Axelrod's "norms game" suggests that such internalization is not only likely but cru-




on-going Soviet-American contest in which expectations are shaped. He
points out that "[s]anctions can have a beneficial secondary effect. In the
case of the grain embargo, even though the American ban did not suc-
ceed in forcing the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan, it may have
made similar forays less likely in the future by imposing even limited,
short-term costs."
'129
Containment, in its expectations function, does not, as Walter Lipp-
mann argued, show a disbelief in the possibility of "settlement" among
rivals. 130 Rather, by organizing a balance of power such that rivals can-
not afford to commit aggression, 131 containment as a legal concept actu-
ally promotes settlement through shared expectations that the balance of
power will not be overturned. It is the reactive quality of containment
that is stabilizing, in that it seeks only to promote settlement.
Lippmann argued that a "free and undirected economy" could not
marshall the resources required for a policy of containment, especially if
the strategy required a sustained response of ten to fifteen years.132 As
noted above, policy-making is more difficult when decision-makers must
educate the public and get its consent for costly strategies. 133 Yet Lipp-
mann assumed far too quickly that, once educated in the strategy of con-
tainment, the American people would opt out and risk the instability
produced by a hands-off attitude toward the processes of international
change. The requirement of consent might actually strengthen public re-
solve to bear the burden of meeting Soviet expansionary pressure, espe-
cially if the policy is explained as a corollary of a public law "rule" that
promotes a stable international environment.
Containment requires that choices be made with respect to the use of
power. 134 Not all difficult situations in world politics require state reac-
tion in order to achieve the public order goals of stability and settlement.
Strategy involves careful assessment of, and reaction to, the situations
likely to produce changes in the balance of power. Moreover, in some
instances self-sacrifice and restraint are required on the part of the most
powerful states in order to achieve a preferred "alternative future" of
stability that represents a compromise between realism and utopian-
ism.1 35 For example, as Blinken points out, the application of sanctions
129. P. 145.
130. Lippmann, supra note 116, at 882..
131. Id. at 883.
132. Id. at 872-73.
133. See supra note 97; see also BETWEEN POWER AND PLENTY, supra note 49 (on the
effect of domestic economy on foreign policy choices).
134. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan may produce important
secondary effects by shaping expectations of the costs of such adventur-
ism. 136 This is a situation that clearly challenges the balance of power
and demands reaction by the West. On the other hand, peacetime com-
merce with the Eastern bloc may actually promote the public order goal
of stability.137 After all, peacetime commerce does not implicate the bal-
ance of power, unless one comes to the extreme assessment that all bene-
fits from trade are used to bolster the Soviet military threat. 138 Because
the Pipeline controversy did not threaten the balance of power, it was a
situation that did not require reaction. For this reason, the Atlantic Alli-
ance demanded "self-sacrifice" on the part of the United States in order
to promote the public order goal of stability. Blinken suggests the desira-
bility of such discrimination with respect to foreign policy tactics:
"American interests would be best served by streamlining the embargo
list so that it covers only technology whose primary application is mili-
tary. Rather than build short fences around broad areas, we should erect
tall barriers around carefully defined areas."'
39
D. Notes on an International Law Framework for Foreign Policy
Theorists in both international relations and international law have
been moving toward a common analytic perspective upon which an inter-
national law strategy based on expectations generated from political
practice may be crafted. I4° "Policy science" has been developed in both
international relations and international law as a method of analyzing the
conditions under which power is used. In international relations, Alex-
ander George and Richard Smoke have discussed what is required to
make theory relevant to policy in their study of deterrence.1'1 They ar-
gue that policy science offers insights to decision-makers for coping with
specific problems by developing "contingent generalizations" that "iden-
tify how relevant situational variables change and vary according to cir-
cumstances."' 142 As policy science advocates note, international law need
not exist only when behavior is conforming exactly to a promulgated
rule. The policy science focus on expectations based on practice can pro-
136. P. 145.
137. See p. 150.
138. See DeSouza, supra note 10, at 92 n.2.
139. P. 141.
140. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
141. See A. GEORGE & R. SMOKE, DETERRENCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE-
ORY AND PRACTICE 618 (1974).




vide useful insight into policy-making problems in international
relations.
Policy science has been developed from the jurisprudential perspective
by Myres McDougal and W. Michael Reisman.1 43 Like the policy sci-
ence approach to international relations, McDougal and Reisman's ap-
proach to jurisprudence is one oriented toward problem-solving and
based on practice. It examines shared expectations with respect to the
choice of policy, its authority, and its control. 144 In this way, the policy
science approach to jurisprudence seeks to channel the use of power in
international relations by developing Carr's ingredients for law in the
political community: goals, moral judgment, and grounds for action.
More recently, Professor Reisman and Andrew Willard have developed a
unit of analysis, called the "incident," through which international law
derived from practice may be described, tested, and refined. The incident
methodology uses a case study approach, similar to that used in identify-
ing the common law, to explore the crystallization of expectations during
crises.145 It considers a variety of sources of law in world politics, but
focuses on practice in deriving expectations in the international political
community. Such an orientation is critical given the anarchic structure
of international relations. The incident approach thus offers a methodol-
ogy for developing an expectations framework that uses concepts such as
containment to ground our vision of international society in realism.
Conclusion
Antony Blinken offers much information, solid analysis, and a starting
point from which to develop a foreign policy framework grounded in
theories of international relations and international law. Like Heming-
way's bridge, the Pipeline crisis can serve as a window through which to
143. See, eg., McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Theories About International Law: Pro-
logue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS, supra note 42, at 43,
139-41.
144. McDougal & Reisman, supra note 42, at 355-56.
145. INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS: THE LAW THAT COUNTS (W. Reisman & A. Willard
eds. 1988) (forthcoming); see also Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New
Genre in the Study ofInternational Law,. 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1984); Willard, Incidents: An
Essay in Method, 10 YALE 3. INT'L L. 21 (1984). For an application of the incident methodol-
ogy to the Soviet Pipeline crisis, see DeSouza, supra note 10. For an evaluation of the incident
methodology, compare Falk, The Validity of the Incidents Genre, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 376
(1987) (lauding the genre's contribution), with Bowett, International Incidents: New Genre or
New Delusion? 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 386 (1987) (arguing that the genre is neither novel nor
superior to traditional methods).
Professor George has also developed a case study method for the development of interna-
tional relations theory. He uses John Stuart Mill's method of similarities and differences in
analyzing international crises. See A. George, Case Study Method for International Relations
2, 3, 7-8 (1982) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Yale Journal of International Law).
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view the broader context of human behavior. The Pipeline crisis exposed
the alliance politics involved in East-West trade, and Blinken describes
these well. Yet the crisis also raised geopolitical questions regarding our
vision of a preferred world public order and the minimum requisites for
achieving such order-questions that Blinken leaves largely unanswered.
Like Professor Cover's bridge, the Pipeline crisis was a focal point in
the historical process through which the international community creates
shared expectations about future behavior. The Atlantic Alliance's insis-
tence on reinforcing the norm favoring peacetime commerce reinforced
important goals of international society, such as stability and settlement.
These decisions may prove to be a precedent that has a "braking" effect
on the process of international change.
International relations theory does not currently take sufficient ac-
count of how such norms influence state behavior. One potentially help-
ful direction for future research on the role of norms is to use insights
from economics and game-theory to study the formation and influence of
expectations about behavior. Research in this direction should focus on
interactive decision-making. Some of this ground has already been bro-
ken by international relations theorists and international law scholars
who have a "policy-science" orientation. By surveying patterns of deci-
sions and the expectations they generate, scholars can trace the path of
choices toward a preferred future.
Containment is one policy that captures these ideas for developing an
expectations framework that integrates theories from international law
and international relations. Containment attempts to structure expecta-
tions over time, setting forth "rules of the game" that channel interna-
tional behavior into certain paths. It can help shape expectations for
policies such as economic sanctions. These expectations, in turn, struc-
ture the context in which future decisions will be made.
An expectations framework requires not only active shaping of expec-
tations through immediate policy responses such as economic sanctions,
but also sensitivity to the expectations flowing from existing norms, such
as the autonomy of states in conducting peacetime commerce. In an in-
ternational legal order whose rules are primarily visible by reference to
state practice, settled expectations demarcate public international law by
tracing a path of decision that forms the span of our omnipresent bridge
to a particular future.
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